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Abstract 
 
We investigate whether Norwegian PE-backed companies engage in tax planning activities 
to a larger extent than their peers, and if PE-firms operating in Norway actively look for 
targets that hold a potential for tax optimization, by utilizing five proxies for tax planning. 
Our results show that Norwegian PE-backed companies exhibit significantly larger leverage 
ratios than comparable companies. The PE-backed companies’ leverage ratios are on 
average 100.82 percentage points higher than the ratios of non-PE-backed companies. This 
indicates that PE-backed companies engage in tax planning activities to a somewhat larger 
extent than their peers, by generating debt tax shields. We do although see limitations to 
this result, as we have not included holding company debt of the peer companies in our 
sample, and as we cast doubt over the relevance of using Leverage Ratio as a proxy for tax 
planning. In addition to this, none of the four other proxies for tax planning we investigate 
display significant differences between the tax planning activities performed in PE-backed 
companies and comparable non-PE-backed companies. This result is very different from 
the findings in similar studies performed on American and Finnish data, and indicates that 
Norwegian PE-backed companies are much less tax aggressive than similar foreign 
companies. Our research also shows that PE-firms operating in Norway do not deliberately 
seek out target companies that hold a potential for tax optimization, as there exist no 
differences in the level of tax planning activities in PE-Target companies and comparable 
non-PE-backed firms. 
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Introduction 
In this thesis, we examine the tax planning activities of Norwegian private equity (PE)-
backed companies. The thesis consists of two hypotheses we seek to analyze in order to 
draw conclusions about the tax planning activities of Norweigan PE-backed companies.  
 
Prior research performed for other countries shows that PE-backed companies tax plan to 
a much larger extent than comparable companies. In our first hypothesis, we therefore wish 
to investigate if this is the case for Norwegian PE-backed companies as well. Our study is 
performed through a method called propensity score matching (PSM), where we compare 
the level of tax planning activities in PE-backed companies with their PSM-generated peer 
group, by using five proxies for tax planning. We find that Norwegian PE-backed 
companies display significantly different values than their peers for only one out of our five 
proxies for tax planning. This proxy is Leverage Ratio, and Norwegian PE-backed 
companies’ leverage ratios are on average 100.82 percentage points higher than the leverage 
ratios of non-PE-backed companies.  
 
However, this result might be biased in the PE-backed companies’ disfavor, as we have 
only attached holding company debt to the PE-backed companies, and not to their peers. 
This questions the level of significance of our result. The relevance of using Leverage Ratio 
as a proxy for tax planning is also questionable, as Norwegian legislation allows for interest 
rate deductions to be made. It might thus become difficult to accuse firms of extensive tax 
planning by having high leverage ratios, when the government encourages firms to generate 
debt tax shields by allowing it. If we exclude Leverage Ratio from our list of tax planning 
proxies, none of our remaining proxies display significant differences between the tax 
planning activities performed in PE-backed companies and their peers. This result is very 
different from the findings in similar studies performed on American and Finnish data, and 
indicates that Norwegian PE-backed companies are much less tax aggressive than similar 
foreign companies.   
 
In our second hypothesis, we investigate whether PE-firms actively seek out target 
companies that hold a potential for tax optimization. This is also done trough utilizing the 
propensity score matching method, where we compare the tax planning activities in PE-
backed companies prior to their PE-backing (PE-Targets) with comparable non-PE-backed 
companies. We use the same five proxies for tax planning here as in our first hypothesis, 
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and find no significant differences between the tax planning activities performed in the PE-
Target companies and in the comparable non-PE-backed companies. We thus infer that 
PE-firms do not deliberately seek out targets that hold a potential for tax optimization.  
Structure of the Rest of the Thesis  
 
The rest of the thesis will follow this structure: In Section I we describe previous research 
and hypothesis development, in Section II we describe the construction of the dataset we 
base our thesis on, in Section III we review the methodology employed in the study, in 
Section IV we present the our results and analyze them, and in Section V we conclude our 
thesis. 
SECTION I: Previous Research and Hypothesis Development  
 
Prior research shows that PE-firms create economic value in their portfolio companies 
through effective governance, financial and operational engineering (Kaplan & Strömberg, 
2008). As PE-firms closely monitor and control their portfolio companies, PE-firms’ tax 
practices are likely to influence the tax practices of their portfolio firms. PE-firms also have 
substantial expertise and resources at their disposal, enhancing their ability to promote 
effective tax strategies that create economic value in portfolio firms (Badertscher, Katz, & 
Rego, 2010). With regard to that, we wish to investigate whether PE-firms view tax 
planning as an additional source of economic value.  
In addition to this, Badertscher, Katz, & Rego (2010) document that American PE-backed 
companies engage in significantly higher levels of tax planning and have lower marginal tax 
rates than other private firms. Moreover, they document that PE-backed companies pay 
14.2 percentage points less income tax per dollar of pre-tax income than non-PE-backed 
firms, after controlling for net operating loss carry forwards and debt tax shields 
(Badertscher, Katz, & Rego, 2010). A similar study conducted on Finnish data, concludes 
that Finnish PE-backed companies on average report a 3.4 percentage points lower income 
tax per euro of operating income than comparable companies (Alahuhta, 2013).  
 
Because we believe that PE-firms might have the incentives and possibilities to influence 
their portfolio companies’ tax planning activities, and because prior studies in the field have 
provided evidence of such behavior, we wish to investigate whether Norwegian PE-backed 
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companies show similar results as in the American and Finnish studies. With this in mind, 
we develop our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Norwegian PE-backed companies exhibit systematically higher levels of tax planning than non-PE-
backed private companies. 
 
In a study performed on French firms, LeNadant & Perdreau (2012) find a positive 
correlation between the likelihood of becoming a buyout target and high levels of income 
taxes. They also find that buyout targets are less indebted than their counterparties. 
LeNadant and Perdreau (2006) suggest that the higher taxes can partly be explained by their 
low debt. Kaplan (1989) also finds that tax benefits created through leverage (debt tax 
shields) are a large source of value creation in LBOs. However, the benefits of such value 
creation must be balanced against the costs of debt. If the debt level is initially high in the 
PE-targets, there will be less of a gain to extract from purchasing the company. Of these 
reasons, we believe that it would be interesting to investigate whether PE-firms also 
deliberately seek out Norwegian target companies with a potential for greater tax planning. 
Our second hypothesis is thus:  
 
H2: PE-firms’ Norwegian target companies engage in tax planning activities to a smaller extent than their 
peer companies. 
SECTION II: Data and Sample Selection 
 
In this section, we will describe how we construct the dataset used in this thesis. The data 
we use is delivered from several sources, and below we will describe in detail how we 
construct the final sample we utilize in our analysis, and from which sources the data are 
collected. In both of our hypotheses we use the same dataset; the only difference is what we 
use as dependent variables and the construction of these.  
Definition of PE-backed companies  
 
The term PE-backed companies refers in this thesis to companies that are currently owned 
by PE-firms, and which were initially acquired through a buyout investment. This means 
that we have excluded PE-backed portfolio companies that are considered to be in the 
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investment stages “seed” or “venture”. We choose to do so because seed and venture 
investments are fundamentally different from buyouts, and will have much smaller 
incentives to engage in tax planning activities as such investments will usually not face 
positive results for several years into the investment horizon (Fenn, Lang, & Prowse, 1995). 
Choice of Peer Group  
 
We limit our analysis to focus on Norwegian companies only, and by Norwegian companies 
we refer to companies that are tax domiciled in Norway. This is done because tax planning 
in Norwegian PE-backed portfolio companies is, to our knowledge, an unexplored research 
area. We use Norwegian private limited companies (AS) as our peer group to the PE-
backed and PE-target companies. This is because we believe this group of companies will 
share a greater number of characteristics with PE-backed and PE-target companies than for 
instance public limited companies, partnerships or sole proprietorships. This limitation is in 
accordance with Badertscher Katz & Rego’s (2010) study, which resembles ours to a certain 
extent. We will refer to the peers as non-PE-backed companies or peer companies.  
Base Set 
 
Data we received from the Norwegian Tax Authorities (Skatteetaten) make up the basis of 
our dataset. This dataset consists of ”Næringsoppgave 2” for the years 2003-2014, an 
appendix to the Tax Returns Form, which is a statement of the main items on the income 
statement and balance sheet of a company. ”Næringsoppgave 2” is mandatory to report for 
every Norwegian private limited company (AS), and we thus have the income statements 
and balance sheets of every Norwegian private limited company for 12 consecutive years, 
which we will refer to as the base set further on. This dataset initially consists of 350,836 
companies and 2,217,483 observations. 
Data Quality  
 
We are given access to complete and detailed income statements and balance sheets for all 
Norwegian private companies from the Norwegian Tax Authorities. Because of this, we 
believe that the quality of our data material is greater than the quality of the data material 
used in studies comparable to ours, such as Alahuhta (2013) and Badertscher, Katz, & Rego 
(2010). Alahuhta’s (2013) study is limited by the fact that all taxation related data 
attributable to the companies is confidential in Finland, and only tax authorities have access 
 9 
to the data. Of these reasons, Alahuhta (2013) is forced to create estimates of different 
taxation figures, while we have access to the exact figures from the information provided by 
the Norwegian Tax Authorities. Badertscher, Katz, & Rego’s (2010) data sample consists of 
private firms that have publicly-traded debt. In the US, private companies are in general not 
required to file their information with the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
However, because the debt in the companies Badertscher, Katz, & Rego (2010) are looking 
at is public, these firms must file financial statements with the SEC, even though their 
equity is privately held. In order to more precisely identify the specific means of tax 
planning used by portfolio companies, they have to hand-collect tax footnote information 
from SEC financial filings. Their sample of hand-collected data includes 76 PE-backed 
companies and 38 companies that are non-PE-backed. This hand-collected taxation 
information will be less accurate and extensive than the information we have received from 
the Norwegian Tax Authorities. The thorough and reliable taxation data we are in 
possession of will thus represent a strength of our analysis.  
Identifying PE-Backed Companies  
 
The next step in the construction of our dataset is to merge the base set with data that can 
identify the companies that are PE-backed and also the time horizon for which they are 
PE-backed. This information is collected from the Argentum Center of Private Equity 
(ACPE) database, which we were given access to by Carsten Bienz. By merging our base set 
with ACPE-data based on organization numbers, we are able to create dummy variables 
that indicate PE-ownership. The term PE-backed companies refers to companies that are 
currently owned by PE-firms, and which were initially acquired through a buyout 
investment. As a result of this, we drop all portfolio companies that are classified as in the 
investment stages “seed” or “venture”. This leaves us with 161 PE-backed companies.  
Inclusion of Holding Company Debt  
 
As a lot of debt related to the PE-backed companies can be kept in holding companies, we 
want to identify each PE-backed company’s holding structure, and attach the holding 
company’s debt to the PE-backed company if possible. This is because we believe that the 
holding companies might have taken on substantial amounts of debt related to the buyouts 
of the PE-backed companies. From Carsten Bienz we were given access to a dataset where 
the holding structures of 134 PE-backed companies were already identified, and further we 
hand-collect the holding structures for an additional 42 PE-backed companies by looking 
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them up in The Brønnøysund Register Center (Brønnøysundregistrene). PE-backed 
companies whose holding company has ownership stakes in other companies as well are 
excluded, as we in these cases will be unable to identify the debt attached to the specific 
PE-backed company in question. By attaching the debt from the holding companies we 
have identified to the PE-backed companies, we believe to have created a more realistic 
debt structure of the PE-backed companies than without attaching this debt. 
 
A problem that arises with regard to this, however, is the fact that we do not have 
information on the holding structures of all the companies in our base set. Within the time 
frame of this thesis, it would not be possible to look up the holding structures of each 
company in our base set. This can potentially create artificially larger leverage ratios of our 
PE-backed companies versus the non-PE-backed, which represents a weakness of our 
analysis.  
Industry Classification 
 
When calculating the tax planning proxy Discretionary Permanent Book-Tax-Differences 
(as described later on in this paper), we find the residual of a regression, which is estimated 
by industry and year. Because of this, we need industry codes attached to each company in 
our sample. We also use the industry codes in the propensity score matching method as an 
observational firm characteristic. The industry codes are collected from the SNF database; a 
database owned by the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) and the SNF foundation. 
This database contains accounting and corporate information for all Norwegian public and 
private firms. From the SNF database, we use the industry classification system called 
“Bransjekode 2”, which consists of 973 different codes, and assign one code to each 
company in our sample.   
Omitted Observations 
 
Many of the proxies for tax planning, and also the observable firm characteristics used in 
the propensity score matching, are lagged variables. Our dataset is therefore incomplete for 
the years 2003 and 2004, as many missing values are generated for these years. Because of 
this, we choose to leave these years out of our analysis. Observations from these years have 
although been useful when generating lagged values for later years. Omitting the years 2003 
and 2004 from our dataset reduces the number of PE-backed companies to 129. We also 
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drop observations where variables used in the analysis are missing from our final dataset. 
This further reduces the number of PE-backed companies to 74. 
 
Some of the observations in our sample are observations of companies that have been 
exited by PE-firms. These would have been classified as non-PE-backed firms. However, 
since they might have been affected by their previous PE-backing, we choose to exclude 
observations of firms that have previously been PE-backed. 
 
 
After merging our base set with data from ACPE and SNF, in addition to correcting for the 
PE-backed companies’ holding company debt, we have constructed the final datasets to be 
used in our analysis. In the section below, we will describe the observation and company 
distributions for both Hypothesis 1 and 2 in greater detail.  
 
Table 1: Yearly Observation Distribution in the Final Dataset for 
Hypothesis 1 
Table 1 reports the observation distribution of PE-Backed and Non-PE-backed companies in 
Hypothesis 1 for each year. The column “Non-PE-Backed” shows the number observations of 
companies that are not PE-Backed in our sample for each year. The column “PE-Backed” shows 
the number of observations of PE-backed companies for each year in our sample. “Total” displays 
the total number of company observations we have in our sample for each year.   
Year                  Non-PE-Backed PE-backed Total 
2005 41,536 8 41,544 
2006 52,367 13 52,380 
2007 59,520 20 59,540 
2008 55,269 30 55,299 
2009 57,828 24 57,852 
2010 61,264 25 61,289 
2011 63,211 31 63,242 
2012 65,438 23 65,461 
2013 64,197 22 64,219 
2014 62,150 24 62,174 
Total 582,780 220 583,000 
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For hypothesis 1, our final dataset consists of 160,846 companies, where 74 of these are 
marked as PE-Backed companies. Over the years 2005-2014, we have a total of 583,000 
firm-year observations, where 220 of these are PE-Backed company observations. 
Dataset for Hypothesis 2 
 
For Hypothesis 2, we extend the final dataset using in Hypothesis 1 by creating a dummy 
variable indicating whether a company is going to get PE-backed at a later stage or not, 
called PE-Target. If the company is to get PE-backed at a later stage, it is assigned a dummy 
value of 1 for the years prior to the PE-backing. At the time when a company actually is 
PE-backed, this year and the subsequent firm years are deleted from the sample, as we want 
to compare the companies prior to8 getting PE-backed to valid peers, which we believe a 
PE-backed company will not be. The observation distribution for each firm year is 
displayed below.  
Table 3: Yearly Observation Distribution in the Final Dataset for Hypothesis 2 
Table 3 reports the observation distribution of Non-PE-Targets and PE-Target companies in Hypothesis 2 
for each year. The column “Non-PE-Targets” shows the number of observations of companies that are not 
targets for PE-firms in our sample for each year. The column “PE-Targets” shows the number of 
observations of PE-Target companies for each year in our sample. “Total” displays the total number of 
 
Table 2: Total Observation Distribution in the Final Dataset for Hypothesis 1 
Table 2 reports the number of companies and observations used in the analysis of hypothesis 1, specified by 
whether the company is PE-backed or not. The full sample consists of 160,846 unique firms and 583,000 
observations. The column “PE-Backed” specifies the number of PE-backed companies and the number of 
observations of PE-backed companies in the sample. The column “Non-PE-Backed” specifies the number 
of non-PE-backed companies and observations of non-PE-backed companies in the sample. “Total” 
specifies the total number of companies in the sample, consisting of both PE-backed and non-PE-backed 
companies. The last column is the sum of the first two columns. In this column, the numbers are larger than 
the “Total” column due to the fact that some of the companies in the sample are non-PE-backed in certain 
years and PE-backed in other years. One company can thus be classified as PE-backed in one year and non-
PE-backed in another, but it will never have two different classifications in the same year.  
  PE-Backed Non-PE-Backed Total PE+Non-PE 
Firms 74 160,800 160,846 160,874 
Observations 220 582,780 583,000 583,000 
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observations of companies we have in our sample for each year.  
Year Non-PE-Targets PE-Targets Total 
2005 48,249 28 48,277 
2006 59,615 20 59,635 
2007 64,886 17 64,903 
2008 58,956 9 58,965 
2009 60,977 9 60,986 
2010 64,277 8 64,285 
2011 66,154 5 66,159 
2012 68,364 5 68,369 
2013 67,012 1 67,013 
2014 64,910 0 64,910 
Total 623,400 102 623,502 
 
 
 
We see that there are zero observed PE-targets for year 2014 and only one observation for 
year 2013, and we hence omit these years from our analysis of Hypothesis 2.  
Table 4: Total Observation Distribution in the Final Dataset for Hypothesis 2 
Table 4 reports the number of companies and observations used in the analysis of Hypothesis 2, specified by 
whether the company is a PE-Target or not. The full sample consists of 149,181 unique firms and 491,579 
observations. The column “PE-Target” specifies the number of PE-target companies and the number of 
observations of PE-Target companies in the sample. The column “Non-PE-Target” specifies the number of 
companies and observations that are not PE-Targets in the sample. “Total” specifies the total number of 
companies and observations in the sample, consisting of both PE-target and non-PE-target companies. PE-
backed companies are not included among the Non PE-targets, as we believe such an inclusion could possibly 
bias our analysis.  
 
PE-Targets Non PE-Targets Total 
Firms 41 149,140 149,181 
Observations 101 491,478 491,579 
 
For Hypothesis 2, our final dataset consists of 149,181 companies, where 41 of these are 
marked as PE-targets. Over the years 2005-2012, we have a total of 491,579 firm-year 
observations, where 101 of these are PE-target observations. 
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Limitations to Our Dataset  
 
When looking at individual years, we have a relatively small number of observations of PE-
backed companies and PE-Targets, which might represent a small-sample bias. This applies 
particularly to the years 2013 and 2014 in Hypothesis 2. These years are therefore excluded 
from our analysis. Nevertheless, we note that the small-sample bias might still be present, as 
we continue to have a limited number of observations. We view our small samples as a 
limitation to our analysis. However, this is not an uncommon phenomenon in the area of 
private equity-related research. In addition to this, the Norwegian private equity market is 
small, so the population of PE-backed companies and PE-targets is inherently limited.  
Proxies for Tax Planning  
Definition of Tax Planning  
 
The term tax planning will in this thesis refer to activities carried out in order to minimize a 
company’s tax bill, but we limit the analysis to only looking at legal activities that are utilized 
in order to maximize shareholder value. This means that we do not aim at detecting 
underreporting of income or any other illegal tax related activities. We use five different 
proxies for tax planning in order to compare the tax planning activities of PE-backed and 
PE-target companies to comparable companies. These proxies are used in previous 
research, and we describe them in greater detail in Section II of this thesis.   
 
Description of Our Proxies for Tax Planning 
 
In our analysis, we rely on five proxies of tax planning. Each of the proxies reflects 
different types of tax planning. We utilize four proxies that reflect book-tax nonconforming 
tax planning, which are measures that reduce the firm’s income tax liability but not its 
financial income. We also use Leverage Ratio of the firms as a proxy for tax planning, as 
larger leverage ratios will produce larger tax shields. Below we will describe further what 
these proxies measure, how we have constructed them and why we have chosen to use 
them.  
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Total Book Tax Differences  
 
Like Badertscher, Katz, & Rego (2010), our first proxy for tax planning is an estimate of the 
difference between a firm’s pretax book income and taxable income, scaled with total 
assets, which we refer to as Total Book Tax Differences. This proxy is formally found by: 
 
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘  𝑇𝑎𝑥  𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠     =
(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 −
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 + ∆𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 )
(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)
 
 
The taxable income is estimated by dividing the total tax cost by the statutory tax rate. The 
statutory tax rate for Norwegian companies was 28 percent for all of the years in our 
sample up until 2013, but as the Norwegian tax rules changed in 2014, the tax rate changed 
to 27 percent for this year (Bjertnæs, 2015). 
 
There are a number of studies that suggest that book tax differences can be used as a signal 
of tax planning activity (Badertscher, Katz, & Rego, 2010). Wilson (2009) finds that book-
tax differences are positively associated with cases of tax sheltering, while Mills (1998) finds 
that proposed IRS audit adjustments are positively related to large positive book tax 
differences. Despite the evidence of book tax differences being associated with tax planning 
activities, the book-tax difference measure has limitations (Badertscher, Katz, & Rego, 
2010). For instance, Manzon & Plesko (2002) identify firm specific characteristics 
associated with book tax differences that are not necessarily reflective of corporate tax 
planning.  
Discretionary Permanent Book Tax Differences  
 
Our second proxy for tax planning is Frank, Lynch, & Rego’s (2009) measure called 
Discretionary Permanent Book Tax Differences. This proxy captures tax planning activities 
that directly affect net income through a reduction in total tax expenses. However, the 
proxy does not capture tax planning activities that generate a deferral of cash taxes paid to 
the tax authorities (Badertscher, Katz, & Rego, 2010). Larger values of the proxy 
Discretionary Permanent Tax Differences indicate larger levels of tax planning (McGuire, 
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Omer, & Wang, 2010). We calculate this proxy as the residual of the following regression, 
estimated by industry and year, in accordance with Frank, Lynch, & Rego’s (2009) research: 
 
𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑀𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3Δ𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝐴𝐺𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
𝑃𝐸𝑅𝑀𝐷𝐼𝐹𝐹 =
[{𝐵𝐼 − (
𝐶𝑇𝐸
𝑆𝑇𝑅)} − (
𝐷𝑇𝐸
𝑆𝑇𝑅)]
(𝑏𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑜𝑓 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)
 
 
Table 5: Explanation of the variables in the proxy calculation 
BI= Ordinary Result Before Taxes 
CTE=Current Year Payable Taxes  
STR= Statutory Tax Rate 
DTE= Deferred Taxes 
ΔNOL=Change Net Operating Loss Carry Forwards 
LAGPERM=Lagged Permanent Differences)= PERMDIFF in year t-1 
INTANG= Intangible Assets= 
𝑅&𝐷+(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠+𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠&𝐿𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠)+𝐺𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑙𝑙+𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑆𝑢𝑚 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
  
 
The left hand side of the regression above reflects the permanent book tax differences. The 
right hand side controls for items that are unrelated to tax planning, but that lead to 
permanent differences. The residual is thus intended to reflect the permanent differences 
caused by tax planning.  
 
Like Frank, Lynch, & Rego (2009), we control for intangible assets since differences 
between financial accounting and tax accounting rules create differences between taxable 
and financial income that are unrelated to tax planning. As changes in deferred taxes are 
connected to amortizations, which in turn are not regarded as tax planning activities, we 
control for changes in net operating loss carry forwards (Miller & Skinner, 1998). We also 
control for permanent differences that are persistent through time, and therefore are less 
likely to reflect tax planning, by including lagged permanent differences in our regression. 
However, as Frank, Lynch, & Rego (2009) point out, controlling for lagged permanent 
differences might exclude some tax planning activities if the firm is consistent in its tax 
planning through time.  
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In order to adapt the Discretionary Permanent Book-Tax Differences proxy to Norwegian 
tax rules, we make some modifications to Frank, Lynch, & Rego’s (2009) original proxy. 
For instance, we do not control for state taxes in our proxy. This is because the Norwegian 
system, as opposed to the US system, does not distinguish between state and federal taxes.  
Cash Effective Tax Rate 
  
Our third proxy for tax planning is the Cash Effective Tax Rate, introduced by Dyreng, 
Hanlon, & Maydew (2008). We calculate this proxy as:  
 
Cash Effective Tax Rate=
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒−𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠
 
 
The proxy reflects the actual taxes paid in one particular year. An advantage of using Cash 
Effective Tax Rate as a proxy for tax planning is that this measure is not affected by 
changes in tax contingencies (tax cushion). So regardless of whether a firm records a tax 
cushion in its financial statements, the lower cash tax payments associated with the 
contingencies will be reflected in a lower Cash Effective Tax Rate. A limitation of the proxy 
is that it contains some measurement error, as this measure does not control for 
nondiscretionary sources of book tax differences, and is biased downward for those firms 
that consistently manage their pretax book income upward over extended periods of time 
(Badertscher, Katz, & Rego, 2010). 
 
Similarly to Badertscher, Katz, & Rego (2010), we truncate the Cash Effective Tax Rate to 
the range 0-1 and set the value missing if the denominator is zero or missing. This is done 
in order to make the analysis of the proxy meaningful, as negative denominators will bias 
the analysis in a wrongful way.  
 
Marginal Tax Rate 
 
Our fourth proxy for tax planning is a variety of the proxy Cash Effective Tax Rate, where 
we use operating profits instead of the ordinary result before taxes as the denominator. This 
proxy is developed by Alahuhta (2013), and we call it Marginal Tax Rate, as the purpose of 
 18 
this proxy is to reflect the marginal taxes paid, i.e. the amount of taxes paid on each unit of 
additional income. The Marginal Tax Rate is calculated as: 
 
 
Marginal Tax Rate=
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑎𝑖𝑑
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠
 
 
This measure is also truncated to the range 0-1 and set missing if the denominator is zero or 
missing. The Marginal Tax Rate will capture activities that reduce taxable income without 
reducing operational cash flow. In addition to this, the proxy will reflect if large interest 
expenses are paid to related companies, which in turn could serve as a tool for tax planning 
(Alahuhta, 2013).  
  
Leverage Ratio  
 
Our fifth and last proxy is the leverage ratio of the companies. This is calculated as: 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
 
This is not a typical measure of tax planning in the existing literature on the field. Leverage 
ratio has often been included among other measures in proxies for tax planning, but not as 
an independent variable. Nevertheless, we choose to include it, as debt gives access to 
interest tax deductions that are valuable to the firms (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2008). By 
utilizing Leverage Ratio as a proxy for tax planning, we attempt to capture value creation 
through the generation of debt tax shields. A debt tax shield is the reduction in income 
taxes that results from taking an allowable deduction from taxable income (Schjelderup & 
Schindler, 2015).  
 
 
Schjedrup & Schindler (2015) defines the debt tax shield as:  
 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 = 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∗ 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 
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We do, however, question the relevance of using this proxy as a measure of tax planning. 
Firms do not get tax deductions on dividends and thus not on equity, so the Norwegian tax 
system favors debt over equity. This creates incentives for firms to lever up in order to 
generate interest tax deductions. As the Norwegian government allows for tax deductions 
on interests to be made, it might be difficult to accuse firms of engaging in extensive tax 
planning, as it is perfectly legal to engage in such activities. This represents a weakness to 
using Leverage Ratio as a proxy for tax planning.  
SECTION III: Econometric Matching Methodology, Propensity Score 
Matching 
 
We wish to compare Norwegian PE-backed and PE-Target companies to non-PE-backed 
companies. In order to find firms that are comparable to our PE-backed and PE-Target 
sample companies, we utilize an econometric matching technique called “propensity score 
matching” (PSM), which was first developed by Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983) and extended 
by Heckman & Robb (1986) and Heckman et al. (1997, 1998). We use the statistical 
software package STATA to perform the propensity score matching.  
 
The PSM technique is applied instead of the alternative approach of employing a 
multivariate regression model. According to Drucker & Puri (2005), the PSM method 
employs fewer restrictions than the regression approach. Studies such as Rubin (1997), 
Conniffe, Gash & O’Connell (2000) have confirmed that propensity score matching 
methods can allow for a more accurate analysis.  
 
According to Drucker & Puri (2005), the PSM method allows us to match PE-backed and 
PE-Target companies to non-PE-backed companies based on a one-dimensional propensity 
score that is a function of the companies’ observable characteristics, instead of facing the 
difficult task of matching directly on multiple dimensions. As a result, we effectively match 
PE-backed and PE-Target companies to non-PE-backed companies based on many 
observable characteristics, while not reducing the number of PE-backed and PE-Target 
companies for which we can find matches. Furthermore, the method takes into account the 
fact that the characteristic for PE-backed and PE-Target companies may differ significantly 
from non-PE-backed companies, and ensures that such observed characteristics are not 
driving the results (Drucker & Puri, 2005).  
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Propensity Score Matching Procedure 
 
We will describe the propensity score matching procedure for Hypothesis 1 in great detail 
below. An equivalent explanation applies to Hypothesis 2., and we thus do not include an 
explanation of the propensity score matching procedure for this hypothesis.  
 
In our analysis, PE is our dependent variable in Hypothesis 1, and we let 𝑃𝐸 = 1 if the 
company is a PE-backed company, and let 𝑃𝐸 = 0 if the company is a non-PE-backed 
company. We utilize the five different proxies for tax planning activities Total Book Tax 
Differences, Discretionary Permanent Differences, Cash Effective Tax Rate, Marginal Tax 
Rate and Leverage Ratio as described above. In our analysis, we will refer to these proxies 
as our Y-list. In accordance with Drucker & Puri (2005), the 𝑖𝑡ℎ PE-backed company has 
its observed “PE-backed” tax planning activities 𝑌1𝑖 and a different level of tax planning 
activities 𝑌0𝑖 that would result if the company were not PE-backed.  
 
Following Heckman & Robb (1986), we assume that all relevant differences between PE-
backed companies and non-PE-backed companies are captured by their observable 
characteristics X. Our list of observable characteristics, our X-list, consists of the 
characteristics Return on Assets, the logarithm of the beginning of year Total Assets, firm 
i’s Total Sales in year t, the beginning of year Fixed Assets, and the Industry Classification 
Codes. We have chosen these because we believe they are baseline characteristics for both 
the treated group of PE-backed companies and the control group of non-PE-backed 
companies. 
 
In accordance with Drucker & Puri (2005) we let (𝑌0, 𝑌1) ⊥ PE| X denote the statistical 
independence of (𝑌0, 𝑌1) and PE conditional on X. Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983) establish 
that when (𝑌0,𝑌1) ⊥ PE| X and 0 < 𝑃(𝑃𝐸 = 1|X) < 1 (which are referred to as the 
strong ignorability conditions), then (𝑌0, 𝑌1) ⊥ PE|P(PE = 1|X). While it is often difficult 
to match on high dimension X, this result allows us to match based on the one-dimensional 
𝑃(𝑃𝐸 = 1|X) alone. The propensity score, 𝑃(𝑃𝐸 = 1|X) can be estimated using probit or 
logit models (Drucker & Puri, 2005). In both H1 and H2 we utilize a logit model. Heckman 
et al. (1998) extend this result by showing that the strong ignorability conditions are overly 
restrictive for the estimation of 𝐸(𝑌1 − 𝑌0|PE = 1, X). Instead, a weaker mean 
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independence condition E(𝑌0 | D = 1, P(PE = 1 | X)) = E(𝑌0| PE = 0, P(PE = 1 | X)) is 
all that is required (Drucker & Puri, 2005). 
 
To implement econometric matching, we compute propensity scores for each of the PE-
backed companies and the non-PE-backed companies. There may be companies that have 
propensity scores that are outside of the common support of PE-backed and non-PE-
backed company propensity scores. Using companies that fall outside of the common 
support can substantially bias the results (Drucker & Puri, 2005). As a result, we remove all 
companies that are outside of the common propensity score support.  
 
We use one class of propensity score matching estimators: the nearest neighbor matching. 
In accordance with Drucker & Puri’s (2005) work, we let 𝑌1𝑖 be the tax planning activities 
of a PE-backed company, 𝑌0𝑗 be the tax planning activities of a non-PE-backed company, 
and let ?̅?𝑜𝑖
𝑧  represent the weighted average of tax planning activities of the non-PE-backed 
companies, using estimator z that is matched with 𝑌1𝑖. We compute the sample average of 
tax planning activities differences, 𝑌1𝑖 − ?̅?𝑜𝑖
𝑧 . For each PE-backed company, the nearest 
neighbor-matching estimator chooses the n non-PE-backed companies with closest 
propensity scores to the PE-backed company propensity score. The estimator computes the 
arithmetic average of the tax planning activites of these n non-PE-backed companies. For 
each 𝑌1𝑖, we match ?̅?0𝑖
𝑁𝑁 =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑌0𝑗𝑗∈𝑁(𝑖)  , where 𝑁(𝑖) is the set of non-PE-backed 
companies that are nearest neighbors (Drucker & Puri, 2005). We set n=5 for both 
hypothesis 1 and 2.  
 
We run the propensity score matching method for each individual year from 2005-2014. To 
aggregate the results, we apply Fama & MacBeth’s (1973) procedure as described in 
Cochrane (2005) to find the aggregated averages and variance of the Y-list variables: 
 
𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒: ?̂? = (
1
𝑌
) ∑ 𝜆?̂?
𝑇
𝑡=1
, 
 
𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒: 𝜎2(?̂?) = (
1
𝑇2
) ∑(?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?)
2
𝑇
𝑡=1
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In this way we can calculate the aggregated t-values of our five Y-list variables.  
 
To determine whether econometric matching is a viable method of evaluation, Heckman et 
al. (1997, 1998) identify four features of the data and establish matching techniques that can 
substantially reduce bias: (i) participants and controls have the same distributions of 
unobserved attributes; (ii) participants have the same distributions of observed attributes; 
(iii) outcomes and characteristics are measured in the same way for both groups; and, (iv) 
participants and controls are from the same economic environment (Drucker & Puri, 2005). 
Items (iii) and (iv) are met very well in our study, because the tax planning activities are 
measured in the same way for both PE-backed and non-PE-backed companies, and the 
non-PE-backed company sample is from the same time period as the PE-backed company 
sample. To satisfy condition (ii), we use company characteristics to match PE-backed 
companies to non-PE-backed companies. Feature (i) cannot be achieved in a non-
experimental evaluation (Drucker & Puri, 2005). However, Heckman et al. (1997) note that 
feature (i) is only a small part of bias in their experimental study. Thus, the method of 
matching non-PE-backed companies to PE-backed companies can produce a viable 
estimate of the difference between non-PE-backed and PE-backed tax planning activities.  
SECTION IV: Analysis of Our Results  
 
In this section we will present the results for Hypotheses 1 and 2 and analyze them. The 
results are found by utilizing the propensity score matching method in STATA. 
Hypothesis 1 
 
In Hypothesis 1 we wish to investigate whether PE-backed portfolio companies engage in 
tax planning activities to a larger extent than their peer companies. We aggregate the results 
from the performed propensity score matching for the years 2005-2014.  
 
Table 6, Aggregated Propensity Score Matching Results for Hypothesis 1: 
The table below shows the Aggregated Average Effect of the Treatment on the Treated (Aggr ATT) and the 
t-values of our five proxies for tax planning for Hypothesis 1. These values are found by aggregating the 
results from the propensity score matching method by using the Fama-MacBeth procedure, as described in 
Section III. The Aggr ATT displays the average aggregated differences between the PE-backed companies and 
their peers, aggregated for the years 2005-2014. The detailed calculations made to generate these numbers are 
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found in Table 10 and 11 in the Appendix.  
Proxies Aggr ATT T-values 
 Total Book Tax Differences -0.0089 -1.5028 
 Discretionary Permanent Differences -77.1103 -0.6504 
 Cash Effective Tax Rate  0.0050  0.9905 
 Marginal Tax Rate  0.0013  0.2375 
 Leverage Ratio  1.0082  9.3641*** 
  
From Table 6 above, we observe that only the proxy Leverage Ratio is significant at a five 
percent significance level, with a t-value of 9.3641. From the Aggr ATT column, we see that 
the leverage ratios in the PE-backed companies are on average 100.82 percentage points 
higher than the leverage ratios of comparable non-PE-backed companies. Considering the 
fact that we look at buyouts and know that such transactions often are characterized by 
high leverage, this result is not unexpected. For this proxy we therefore infer that there 
exists a difference in the level of tax planning activities between PE-backed companies and 
their peers, and that this difference points to a larger extent of tax planning activities in PE-
backed versus non-PE-backed companies.  
 
However, the fact that we have attached holding company debt to the PE-backed 
companies, and not to the companies in the peer group, constitutes a potentially severe 
weakness to this result. Within the time frame of this thesis, we are unable to look up the 
holding structures for all of the companies in our sample of non-PE-backed companies. We 
thus have no information about the potential debt that belongs to the non-PE-backed 
companies, which in theory could change our results if attached to the non-PE-backed 
companies. In order to get a slight idea whether such debt exists or not, we manually look 
up the holding structures of each of the PE-backed companies’ peers that were assigned 
through the propensity score matching method. Through this manual screening, we find 
that 18% of the peer companies are owned by holding companies. It thus becomes evident 
that a potential of unattached holding debt in the peer companies exists, which casts doubt 
over the level of significance for the tax planning proxy Leverage Ratio.  
 
The four remaining proxies Total Book Tax Differences, Discretionary Book Tax 
Differences, Marginal Tax Rate and Cash Effective Tax Rate are not significant, which 
means that we find no evidence of PE-backed companies engaging in largers level of tax 
planning than non-PE-backed companies, measured by these proxies. In addition to this, 
we question the relevance of using Leverage Ratio as a tax planning proxy. The generation 
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of debt tax shields through interest tax deductions is a completely legal practice in Norway. 
It might thus be difficult to accuse PE-backed companies of tax planning to a larger extent 
than their peers, when this practice is encouraged by the Norwegian Tax Authorities by 
allowing it. If we therefore exclude the proxy Leverage Ratio from our list of proxies, we 
end up with no significant proxies for tax planning.  
 
For Hypothesis 1, we do not find evidence of PE-backed companies engaging in different 
levels of tax planning when looking at four out of five proxies for tax planning, given a 
significance level of five percent. However, the significance of our fifth proxy, Leverage 
Ratio, indicates that PE-backed companies tax plan by using leverage, and in this way gain 
debt tax shields, to a larger extent than their peers. We do although see limitations to this 
result, as we have not included holding company debt of the peer companies in our sample, 
and as we cast doubt over the relevance of Leverage Ratio as a proxy for tax planning.    
 
Hypothesis 2 
 
In hypothesis 2, we investigate whether PE-firms actively seek out target companies that 
engage in tax planning activities to a smaller extent than their peers, hence, if the targets 
have a potential for tax optimization. We aggregate the results from the performed 
propensity score matching for the years 2005-2012. 
 
 
Table 7, Aggregated Propensity Score Matching Results for Hypothesis 2 
Table 7 below shows the Aggregated Average Effect of the Treatment on the Treated (Aggr ATT) and the t-
values of our five proxies for tax planning for Hypothesis 2. . These values are found by aggregating the 
results from the propensity score matching method by using the Fama-MacBeth procedure, as described in 
Section III. The Aggr ATT displays the average aggregated differences between the PE-Target companies 
and their peers, aggregated for the years 2005-2012. The detailed calculations made to generate these 
numbers are found in Table 12 and 13 in the Appendix.  
Proxies Aggr ATT T-values 
 Total Book Tax Differences 0.0209 1.0522 
 Discretionary Permanent Differences 98.1990 1.0854 
 Cash Effective Tax Rate 0.0098 0.4105 
 Marginal Tax Rate 0.0212 1.5490 
 Leverage Ratio 0.0856 1.4321 
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From table 7 above, we see that none of our proxies for tax planning are significant on 
either a five or a ten percent significance level. We thus find no evidence of PE-firms 
actively seeking out targets with a potential for tax planning from our research, as there 
exist no differences in the level of tax planning activities between PE-target companies and 
comparable companies that are not going to get PE-backed.  
 
Limitations to the Propensity Score Matching Results   
From the propensity score matching diagnostics found in Table 8 and 9 in the Appendix, 
we note that the success of the matching for both Hypothesis 1 and 2 is somewhat varying 
for the different observable firm characteristics we have chosen. This constitutes a 
limitation to our results, as the quality of the matching is suboptimal for some of the 
observable company characteristics we have chosen.   
SECTION V: Conclusion  
In this thesis, we have investigated the hypotheses of 1) whether PE-backed portfolio 
companies engage in tax planning activities to a larger extent than their peers, and 2) if PE-
firms actively seek out targets that have a potential for greater tax planning.  
 
When investigating Hypothesis 1, we find that PE-backed companies display significantly 
higher leverage ratios than non-PE-backed companies. Assuming a five percent significance 
level, PE-backed portfolio companies’ leverage ratios are on average 100.82 percentage 
points higher than the ratios of non-PE-backed companies. However, this result might be 
biased in the PE-backed portfolio companies’ disfavor, as we have only attached holding 
company debt to the PE-backed companies, and not to their peers. This questions the level 
of significance of our result. In addition to this, we question the relevance of using 
Leverage Ratio as a tax planning proxy. It might be difficult to accuse PE-backed 
companies of engaging in tax planning activities to a larger extent than their peers, when 
this practice is encouraged by the Norwegian Tax Authorities by allowing it. If we exclude 
the proxy Leverage Ratio from our list of proxies, we end up with no significant proxies for 
tax planning.  
 
From these findings, we conclude that PE-backed companies to a larger extent than their 
peers tax plan by using leverage, in order to generate tax shields. This is although a 
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conditional conclusion, due to the questionable relevance of Leverage Ratio as a proxy and 
as we have not attached holding company debt to the peer companies. We find no 
indications of PE-backed companies utilizing other tools of tax planning than leverage to a 
larger extent than non-PE-backed companies. Kaplan (1989) finds that tax benefits are a 
large source of wealth in LBOs, and our results with regards to leverage ratio are thus 
consistent with Kaplan’s (1989) findings.    
 
When investigating whether PE-firms actively seek out target companies that hold a 
potential for tax optimization, we find that there exist no significant differences in the levels 
of tax planning between Norwegian PE-Targets and comparable companies. We thus 
conclude that PE-firms operating in Norway do not actively seek out target companies in 
which they can optimize tax planning.    
 
Our results are interesting in the way that they are not as expected. Prior to performing this 
analysis, we believed that Norwegian PE-firms might view tax planning as an additional 
source of income. In addition to this, research from the US and Finland showed that PE-
backed companies in these countries tax plan to a far greater extent than their peers. 
Contrary to Badertscher, Katz & Rego’s (2010) study on American data and Alahuhta’s 
(2013) study on Finnish data, we do not find evidence of extensive tax planning in 
Norwegian PE-backed companies. We thus conclude that PE-firms operating in Norway 
and their Norwegian PE-backed companies exhibit much less aggressive tax planning 
practices than PE-backed companies in the US and Finland. 
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Appendix 
Matching Diagnostics for Hypothesis 1 and 2 
Table 8: Observable Firm Characteristics for Hypothesis 1 
The table reports the matching diagnostics of our performed propensity score matching for Hypothesis 1. 
The matching is performed for the individual years 2005-2014. 
 
Year Coef. Std. Err.         z       P>z 95% Conf.Interval 
Beginning of Year 2005 2.0031 0.3732 5.3700 0.0000 1.2716 2.7346 
Total Assets (logarithm) 2006 1.4378 0.2529 5.6800 0.0000 0.9421 1.9335 
 
2007 1.5036 0.1988 7.5600 0.0000 1.1138 1.8933 
 
2008 1.4409 0.1530 9.4200 0.0000 1.1410 1.7409 
 
2009 1.3014 0.1557 8.3600 0.0000 0.9962 1.6066 
 
2010 1.4460 0.1723 8.3900 0.0000 1.1083 1.7837 
 
2011 1.1189 0.1283 8.7200 0.0000 0.8675 1.3703 
 
2012 1.2435 0.1601 7.7700 0.0000 0.9297 1.5574 
 
2013 1.2385 0.1641 7.5500 0.0000 0.9169 1.5600 
 
2014 1.3003 0.1589 8.1800 0.0000 0.9888 1.6118 
Total Sales 2005 0.0000 0.0000 -0.6600 0.5120 0.0000 0.0000 
 
2006 0.0000 0.0000 -0.8700 0.3820 0.0000 0.0000 
 
2007 0.0000 0.0000 -0.9900 0.3210 0.0000 0.0000 
 
2008 0.0000 0.0000 -1.2300 0.2190 0.0000 0.0000 
 
2009 0.0000 0.0000 -0.7700 0.4410 0.0000 0.0000 
 
2010 0.0000 0.0000 -0.6900 0.4890 0.0000 0.0000 
 
2011 0.0000 0.0000 -0.2600 0.7930 0.0000 0.0000 
 
2012 0.0000 0.0000 -0.9300 0.3500 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
2013 0.0000 0.0000 -0.7300 0.4650 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
2014 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1900 0.8490 0.0000 0.0000 
 Beginning of Year 2005 0.0000 0.0000 -1.9800 0.0470 0.0000 0.0000 
 Fixed Assets 2006 0.0000 0.0000 -1.8500 0.0640 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
2007 0.0000 0.0000 -2.2700 0.0230 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
2008 0.0000 0.0000 -2.4900 0.0130 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
2009 0.0000 0.0000 -2.1100 0.0350 0.0000 0.0000 
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2010 0.0000 0.0000 -2.3700 0.0180 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
2011 0.0000 0.0000 -1.9700 0.0480 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
2012 0.0000 0.0000 -1.9200 0.0540 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
2013 0.0000 0.0000 -1.8100 0.0700 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
2014 0.0000 0.0000 -2.3300 0.0200 0.0000 0.0000 
 Industry Classification 2005 0.0000 0.0000 0.6100 0.5420 0.0000 0.0000 
 Codes 2006 0.0000 0.0000 -0.5200 0.6000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
2007 0.0000 0.0000 0.4200 0.6760 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
2008 0.0000 0.0000 -0.2600 0.7950 0.0000 0.0000 
 
2009 0.0000 0.0000 0.1800 0.8570 0.0000 0.0000 
 
2010 0.0000 0.0000 1.7000 0.0890 0.0000 0.0000 
 
2011 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0500 0.9560 0.0000 0.0000 
 
2012 0.0000 0.0000 -1.3400 0.1800 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
2013 0.0000 0.0000 -1.1900 0.2350 0.0000 0.0000 
 
 
2014 0.0000 0.0000 0.3400 0.7330 0.0000 0.0000 
 Constant 2005 -43.3175 7.0195 -6.1700 0.0000 -57.0754 -29.5596 
 
 
2006 -31.6338 4.6160 -6.8500 0.0000 -40.6810 -22.5865 
 
 
2007 -33.6128 3.7267 -9.0200 0.0000 -40.9170 -26.3086 
 
 
2008 -31.9868 2.9559 -10.8200 0.0000 -37.7802 -26.1934 
 
 
2009 -30.1327 3.0419 -9.9100 0.0000 -36.0948 -24.1707 
 
 
2010 -33.9629 3.3833 -10.0400 0.0000 -40.5939 -27.3318 
 
 
2011 -26.4005 2.4674 -10.7000 0.0000 -31.2365 -21.5646 
 
 
2012 -28.3318 3.0470 -9.3000 0.0000 -34.3038 -22.3599 
 
 
2013 -28.4710 3.1418 -9.0600 0.0000 -34.6287 -22.3132 
 
 
2014 -30.1970 3.0641 -9.8600 0.0000 -36.2026 -24.1915 
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Table 9: Observable Firm Characteristics for Hypothesis 2 
The table reports the matching diagnostics of our performed propensity score matching for Hypothesis 2. 
The matching is performed for the individual years 2005-2012. 
 
Year Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 95% Conf.Interval 
Return on Assets 2005 0.0041 0.0118 0.3500 0.7250 -0.0189 0.0272 
 
2006 0.0001 0.0011 0.0600 0.9500 -0.0020 0.0021 
 
2007 0.0000 0.0005 0.0200 0.9870 -0.0009 0.0010 
 
2008 0.0006 0.0041 0.1500 0.8850 -0.0074 0.0085 
 
2009 0.0000 0.0002 0.0700 0.9440 -0.0004 0.0004 
 
2010 -5.5430 5.7540 -0.9600 0.3350 -16.8206 5.7347 
 
2011 0.0001 0.0036 0.0200 0.9860 -0.0070 0.0071 
 
2012 0.0001 0.0017 0.0300 0.9730 -0.0033 0.0035 
Beginning of Year 2005 1.0615 0.1461 7.2700 0.0000 0.7752 1.3479 
Total Assets (logarithm) 2006 1.0312 0.1737 5.9400 0.0000 0.6907 1.3718 
 
2007 1.1428 0.1876 6.0900 0.0000 0.7750 1.5105 
 
2008 1.2628 0.2542 4.9700 0.0000 0.7647 1.7609 
 
2009 0.8170 0.1962 4.1600 0.0000 0.4324 1.2016 
 
2010 0.8738 0.2413 3.6200 0.0000 0.4009 1.3467 
 
2011 1.1111 0.3759 2.9600 0.0030 0.3743 1.8479 
 
2012 1.0350 0.3264 3.1700 0.0020 0.3953 1.6747 
Total Sales 2005 0.0000 0.0000 -0.4400 0.6600 0.0000 0.0000 
 
2006 0.0000 0.0000 -0.5900 0.5580 0.0000 0.0000 
 
2007 0.0000 0.0000 -0.7700 0.4400 0.0000 0.0000 
 
2008 0.0000 0.0000 -0.6400 0.5210 0.0000 0.0000 
 
2009 0.0000 0.0000 -0.1400 0.8860 0.0000 0.0000 
 
2010 0.0000 0.0000 -0.5200 0.6030 0.0000 0.0000 
 
2011 0.0000 0.0000 -0.5200 0.6010 0.0000 0.0000 
 
2012 0.0000 0.0000 -0.4600 0.6440 0.0000 0.0000 
Beginning of Year 2005 0.0000 0.0000 -1.7700 0.0770 0.0000 0.0000 
Fixed Assets 2006 0.0000 0.0000 -1.4400 0.1510 0.0000 0.0000 
 
2007 0.0000 0.0000 -1.5100 0.1320 0.0000 0.0000 
 
2008 0.0000 0.0000 -1.3700 0.1710 0.0000 0.0000 
 
2009 0.0000 0.0000 -0.6100 0.5420 0.0000 0.0000 
 
2010 0.0000 0.0000 -0.6800 0.4990 0.0000 0.0000 
 
2011 0.0000 0.0000 -0.8000 0.4210 0.0000 0.0000 
 
2012 0.0000 0.0000 -0.7000 0.4840 0.0000 0.0000 
        
Industry Classification 2005 0.0000 0.0000 0.2500 0.8050 0.0000 0.0000 
Codes 2006 0.0000 0.0000 0.7900 0.4310 0.0000 0.0000 
 
2007 0.0000 0.0000 1.2400 0.2140 0.0000 0.0000 
 
2008 0.0000 0.0000 -0.5000 0.6200 0.0000 0.0000 
 
2009 0.0000 0.0000 -0.2600 0.7920 0.0000 0.0000 
 
2010 0.0000 0.0000 -0.5100 0.6070 0.0000 0.0000 
 
2011 0.0000 0.0000 -1.4700 0.1410 -0.0001 0.0000 
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2012 0.0000 0.0000 -1.5000 0.1320 -0.0001 0.0000 
Constant 2005 -24.6361 2.5857 -9.5300 0.0000 -29.7039 -19.5683 
 
2006 -25.1708 3.1123 -8.0900 0.0000 -31.2707 -19.0709 
 
2007 -28.0172 3.4345 -8.1600 0.0000 -34.7486 -21.2857 
 
2008 -29.0804 4.6179 -6.3000 0.0000 -38.1313 -20.0295 
 
2009 -21.9859 3.7356 -5.8900 0.0000 -29.3075 -14.6644 
 
2010 -22.3700 4.5217 -4.9500 0.0000 -31.2324 -13.5075 
 
2011 -26.4023 6.7602 -3.9100 0.0000 -39.6521 -13.1525 
 
2012 -25.2344 6.0341 -4.1800 0.0000 -37.0611 -13.4077 
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Detailed Propensity Score Matching Output  
 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1:  
 
Table 10: ATT Differences for Each Year, Hypothesis 1 
Table X shows the differences in the average effect of the treatment on the treated (ATT) between PE-backed companies and their non-PE-backed peers, for each 
year and each proxy for tax planning. These results are collected from the propensity score matching procedure performed for each year in our sample.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Total Book Tax Diff. -0.0433 -0.0182 0.0013 0.0213 0.0012 -0.0028 0.0050 -0.0059 -0.0385 -0.0090 
Discretionary Perm. Diff. -1017.3632 -2.8180 544.8617 174.4527 -272.8697 -165.3412 0.3663 -20.6212 -8.2302 -3.5399 
Cash Eff. Tax Rate 0.0111 -0.0132 -0.0103 -0.0127 0.0400 -0.0041 -0.0029 0.0129 0.0153 0.0139 
Marginal Tax Rate -0.0068 -0.0310 -0.0149 0.0040 0.0196 -0.0076 -0.0117 0.0131 0.0188 0.0302 
Leverage Ratio  0.7006 0.5324 0.8809 1.2162 1.5667 1.2625 0.7954 0.8520 0.7512 1.5244 
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Table 11: Aggregated Variables for Hypothesis 1 
Table X shows the Aggregated Variance of the differences in the average effect of the treatment on the treated (Aggr Var ATT Diff), the aggregated 
differences in the average effect of the treatment on the treated (Aggr ATT Diff), The aggregated differences in the Standard Deviation of the 
average effect of the treatment of the treated (Aggr S.E. ATT Diff) between the PE-Backed companies and their peers, and lastly, the t-value for 
each of our proxies for tax planning. The Aggr Var ATT Diff is found by 𝜎2(?̂?) = (
1
𝑇2
) ∑ (?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?)
2𝑇
𝑡=1  for each tax planning proxy, while the 
Aggr. S.E. ATT is found by taking the square root of the Aggr. Var ATT Diff. The Aggr. ATT Diff is the average ATT difference between PE-
Target companies and their peers, found by calculating ?̂? = (
1
𝑇
) ∑ 𝜆?̂?
𝑇
𝑡=1 , by using the numbers in table X above. The t-value is then found by 𝑡 −
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 =
𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟 𝐴𝑇𝑇 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓
𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟 𝑆.𝐸.𝐴𝑇𝑇 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓
. 
  Aggr Var ATT Diff Aggr ATT Diff Aggr S.E ATT Diff T-value 
Total Book Tax Differences 0.0000 -0.0089 0.0059 -1.5028 
Discretionary Permanent Differences 14051.8517 -77.1103 118.5405 -0.6505 
Cash Effective Tax Rate 0.0000 0.0050 0.0050 0.9906 
Marginal Tax Rate 0.0000 0.0014 0.0057 0.2376 
Leverage Ratio 0.0116 1.0082 0.1077 9.3642 
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HYPOTHESIS 2: 
 
 
Table 12: ATT Differences for Each Year, Hypothesis 2 
Table X shows the differences in the average effect of the treatment on the treated (ATT) between PE-Target companies and their non-PE-backed 
peers, for each year and each proxy for tax planning. These results are collected from the propensity score matching procedure performed for each year 
in our sample for hypothesis 2. 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Book Tax Diff. 0.0063 -0.0251 -0.0201 0.0868 -0.0504 -0.0167 0.0927 0.0940 
Discretionary Perm. Diff 753.6528 10.2778 154.3006 -32.1277 -10.1108 -88.7132 -1.4618 -0.2253 
Cash Eff. Tax Rate 0.0130 -0.0241 -0.0050 -0.1013 0.0452 0.1567 -0.0009 -0.0047 
Marginal Tax Rate 0.0348 0.0209 0.0309 -0.0471 0.0339 0.0933 0.0239 -0.0206 
Leverage Ratio 0.0788 -0.0276 0.0909 -0.0687 0.3619 -0.1920 0.1888 0.2529 
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Table 13: Aggregated Variables for Hypothesis 2 
Table X shows the Aggregated Variances of the differences in the average effect of the treatment on the treated (Aggr Var ATT Diff), the aggregated 
differences in the average effect of the treatment on the treated (Aggr ATT Diff), the aggregated differences in the Standard Deviation of the average effect 
of the treatment of the treated (Aggr S.E. ATT Diff) between the PE-Target companies and their peers, and lastly, the t-value for each of our proxies for 
tax planning. The Aggr Var ATT Diff is found by 𝜎2(?̂?) = (
1
𝑇2
) ∑ (?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?)
2𝑇
𝑡=1  for each tax planning proxy, while the Aggr. S.E. ATT is found by taking 
the square root of the Aggr. Var ATT Diff. The Aggr. ATT Diff is the average ATT difference between PE-Target companies and their peers, found by 
calculating ?̂? = (
1
𝑇
) ∑ 𝜆?̂?
𝑇
𝑡=1 , by using the numbers in table X above. The t-value is then found by 𝑡 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 =
𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟 𝐴𝑇𝑇 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓
𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟 𝑆.𝐸.𝐴𝑇𝑇 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓
. 
  Aggr Var ATT Average ATT Aggr S.E ATT T-value 
Book Tax Diff. 0.0004 0.0209 0.0199 1.0522 
Discretionary Perm. Diff 8183.8920 98.1990 90.4649 1.0855 
Cash Eff. Tax Rate 0.0006 0.0099 0.0240 0.4105 
Marginal Tax Rate 0.0002 0.0213 0.0137 1.5490 
Leverage Ratio 0.0036 0.0856 0.0598 1.4322 
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